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ABSTRACT
Linked Data technologies become increasingly important in
many domains. Key factors for their breakthrough are se-
curity and trust. Classical means for access control lack
granularity when parts of the Linked Data graph must be
protected. The WebID, combining semantic web concepts
with methods from certificate based authentication and au-
thorization, seems promising to fulfill all requirements con-
cerning security and trust in the semantic web.
In the PerSemID project, we challenged the WebID tech-
nology with a fully implemented proof-of-concept (PoC) ad-
dressing a workflow coming from the domain of lifelong learn-
ing and student mobility. In our use case of study enroll-
ment, we used WebIDs for authentication and to grant ac-
cess to parts of triple stores, during cross domain triple store
interactions to exchange data between stakeholders.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy→Authentication; Access con-
trol; Authorization; Usability in security and pri-
vacy;
Keywords
Semantic Web, WebID, Linked Data, Access Control, Au-
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1. INTRODUCTION
PerSemID[1], the successor of the CV3.0 project[2], in-
vestigated issues remaining open in practical applications
of the WebID[3] technology: its use for authentication and
authorization in triples stores.
While not questioning WebID’s general security proper-
ties – they are implied by the underlying mechanisms based
on client certificate authentication given by Transport Layer
Security (TLS) – we investigated the question of trust, or
more specifically the question of level of assurance (LoA)[4]
in WebIDs. The LoA, an important concept in identity and
access management, states a quality level regarding authen-
tications.
The second aspect concerns the application of WebID for
access control to resources, operated by independent parties
and in distributed environments. Here, we focused on triple
stores and platforms for document management.
Our use case in the domain of lifelong learning and stu-
dent mobility shows the use of Linked Data for adminis-
trative processes in enrollment for studies. The concepts
developed in our complete proof-of-concept prototype can
easily be adapted to similar processes in other domains.
2. RELATEDWORK
PerSemID lies at the intersection of two domains: iden-
tity and access management (IAM) and semantic web based
technologies with a focus on attribute transfer and document
management.
Web Access Control[5] is one of the first approaches in
providing authorization based on WebIDs acting on the level
of HTTP resources.
Universal Access Control (UAC)[6], which we used in
CV3.0, goes further and provides access control at the level
of individual triples. Like UAC, the Privacy Preference On-
tology[7] provides access control at triple level.
WebID+ACO[8] is an ontology for authorization which fo-
cuses on adding a role-based authorization model to HTTP.
S4AC[9] is a vocabulary for creating access control policies
focusing on named graphs. S4AC is used by the SHI3LD
project[10] for specifying permissions.
The MyProfile project offered an IDP service for WebID
as well as a platform for social networking. Online resources
of MyProfile are not available anymore, detailed information
can be found in Sambra[11]. Recently, a new initiative called
Solid[12] seems to take up on MyProfile.
3. WEBID
WebID authentication builds on the authentication of a
client using X.509[13] client certificates. Functionality for
using such certificates is present in all major browsers.
To deliver additional information (for example personal at-
tributes) and to establish URIs as identificator for a par-
ticular entity, WebID references a FOAF profile[14] using
a standard extension of X.509 (the Subject Alternate Name
(SAN) field). Figure 1 gives an overview of authentication
using WebID. The client (identified by its X.509 client cer-
tificate with corresponding key pair) wants to authenticate
to an application running on a (web-)server. The webserver
retrieves the FOAF profile referenced in the SAN of the cer-
tificate and compares the information about the public key
against the information obtained from the client certificate
in the TLS handshake. If they match, authentication is suc-
cessful. If desired, additional potentially signed attributes
and other information can be retrieved from the profile.
Anyone can issue a self-declared WebID by simply gener-
ating an appropriate certificate and publishing a correspond-
ing FOAF profile document on a webserver.
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Figure 1: WebID working principle
The search for trust in WebID is a general problem which
can also be found in other systems that use public key cryp-
tography – as for instance classical X.509 certificates for
websites or secure mail. Today, still the most common ap-
proach in creating trust is the hierarchical Public Key In-
frastructure (PKI) model with certificate authorities.
SuisseID, a PKI operated according to national signature
laws[15] by privately held certificate authorities (accredited
by the state), provides X.509 certificates for authentication
and digital signing on hardware tokens. Besides the PKI,
SuisseID also runs an attribute authority which provides
additional information about the holder of a certificate, like
name, date of birth or gender.
Being widely recognised, accepted, and having a very high
level of trust, SuisseID would be an ideal partner for strength-
ening the LoA of a WebID. Furthermore, the attribute au-
thority functionality could seamlessly be integrated into the
FOAF profile server, thus providing the same attributes with
the same level of assurance for the Linked Data world.
Extending SuisseID with WebID is technically not a hard
problem: Certificates issued by SuisseID must be extended
to include the proper SAN extension, containing the URI to
the corresponding FOAF profile, and the issuing certificate
authority must operate a webserver for serving these FOAF
profile documents accordingly.
We took on the integration approach as described and
validated it prototypically using the demo SuisseID identity
provider from [16] (details are in [17]).
Even though not being a new technology (surfaced end of
2008), WebID has not found broad adoption so far. While
looking simple and flexible at first sight, it suffers from some
issues which have been noted by others [18] already. Most
notably, the overall user experience of WebID seriously hin-
ders broad adoption of the technology and unfortunately,
there seems to be no intention on the part of browser ven-
dors to change this anytime soon. Additionally, nowadays
the user typically owns a multitude of different devices, mak-
ing certificate management nearly impossible.
4. USE CASE
Our PoC aimed to challenge the application of WebID in a
working implementation of a real-life scenario. The workflow
conducted in the enrollment for master studies was chosen
as our exemplary use case. This workflow involves three
primary actors: A student who has successfully obtained a
Figure 2: Configuration of dossier of application by the student
bachelor’s degree (and may have additional qualifications),
the institution at which this degree has been obtained (called
bachelor university) and finally the institution at which the
student whishes to enroll for master studies (the master uni-
versity).
A fully working prototype has been made available [19].
We also produced a screencast [20] demonstrating the main
workflow between all involved parties
From a technical perspective, PerSemID builds upon the
concepts of a personal, semantic curriculum vitae developed
in CV3.0. The architecture for a corresponding platform
for serving and maintaining such a CV has been defined
in CV3.0’s Content Access Service (CAS)[21]. The CAS is
a RDF triple store with additional document management
capabilities as well as an access control layer.
4.1 Actors and Their Actions
In a first step, the student prepares a dossier of application
which contains all relevant information about the degree ob-
tained and possible additional data in form of documents.
Provenance of this data is either personal information en-
tered by the student directly or data obtained from the
bachelor university in the bachelor dossier. The bachelor
dossier is issued by the bachelor university as a single file,
containing Linked Data about the degree obtained and op-
tionally additional documents. All this data is then stored
in the student’s CAS and the student can freely choose to
include/exclude data per application at a master university
(see Figure 2).
After having created the dossier of application, the stu-
dent authorizes the master university to access the dossier
by restricting access based on the university’s WebID which
is assumed to be publicly available.
Next, the addressed master university picks up the dossier
by accessing it on the student’s CAS. Following a review of
all the material in the dossier, a decision regarding accep-
tance to master studies can be made. Now, the master uni-
versity in turn stores its decision in its CAS and authorizes
the WebID, given by the student, to access it.
In the last step, the student finally retrieves the decision
from the master university.
4.2 Architecture and Implementation
4.2.1 Content Access Service
There is no ready-made product similar to a content access
service as specified by [21], thus the needed functionality
had to be implemented in the PoC itself. A large range of
(mature) triple stores is available (see in [22]). We chose
to use Apache Jena[23], that supports SPARQL 1.1 update
together with other requirements.
A deliberately reduced set of document management ca-
pabilities has been implemented in the PoC code itself.
The CAS serves as storage for all metadata related to each
actor and also as location for all application-specific config-
uration data, like file system paths or granted permissions.
An example for the contents of the student’s graph, includ-
ing a granted permission for the WebID hmsc.example.org
can be seen in Listing 1.
Listing 1 Partial example data of a student
@base <\protect\vrule width0pt\protect\
href{http :// example.org/Student }{http
:// example.org/Student}> .
@prefix rdfs: <\protect\vrule width0pt\
protect\href{http ://www.w3.org
/2000/01/rdf -schema #}{ http ://www.w3.
org /2000/01/rdf -schema#}> .
@prefix xsd: <\protect\vrule width0pt\
protect\href{http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema #}{ http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#}> .
@prefix s: <\protect\vrule width0pt\
protect\href{http :// persemid.bfh.ch/
vocab/student #}{ http :// persemid.bfh.ch
/vocab/student#}> .
<#> a s:Student ;
s:webid <\protect\vrule width0pt\
protect\href{http :// example.org/
StudentWebID }{http :// example.org/
StudentWebID}> ;
s:name "Dent" ;
s:vorname "Stu" ;
s:email "stu.dent@example.org" ;
s:matrikelnummer "1 -234 -56" ;
s:permission <\protect\vrule width0pt\
protect\href{http :// hmsc.example.
org/webid#id}{http :// hmsc.example.
org/webid#id}> .
Documents, which can be uploaded by the student and the
bachelor university, are given a unique ID and stored on the
file system. Metadata needed by the server for interacting
with them is again stored in the triple store, in the named
graph of the respective actor.
4.2.2 Server Application
The whole server application has been written in Java-
Script and is running on node.js[24]. HTTP-functionality
has been realized using the widely deployed middleware layer
connect[25] which makes creation of applications serving a
variety of different requests straightforward. All communi-
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Figure 3: Overview of architecture
cation between the frontend application and the server runs
over a single HTTPS port.
On both sides, client and server, we make use of JavaScript
RDF libraries like rdf-ext[26] and ld2h[27]. An overview of
the architecture is given in Figure 3.
4.2.3 WebID Identity Provider
All functionality needed for WebID authentication has
also directly been implemented in the PoC itself, based on
our experience in the implementation of the WebIDP[28]
application, an identity provider for WebID developed in
CV3.0. A dedicated URL of the webserver serves the FOAF
profiles referenced by the client certificates. The certificates
for all actors were generated directly using OpenSSL with
respective configuration files.
4.2.4 Cross-Domain Triple Store Interaction
As described in Section 4.1, all actors follow a defined
scheme of interaction. In this scheme, there are three data
exchanges: download of bachelor data by the student from
the bachelor university, download of data from the student
by the master university and finally, download of data from
the master university by the student.
This can be generalized as a concept for sharing data bet-
ween triplestores or cross-domain triple store interaction.
Multiple methods for implementing such interactions could
be thought of, we considered the following three: (1) cross-
site sharing using HTTP access control, known as CORS [29];
(2) proxying of data on the server side; and (3) explicitly
channeling data through the client.
Being limited by the same-origin policy, that restricts how
a document or script loaded from one origin can interact
with a resource from another origin, a direct interaction bet-
ween the client-side program logic and the content access
service of the remote party in an exchange cannot be imple-
mented – even considering the fact, that in our PoC scenario,
all content was served from the same server. This problem
could be circumvented with HTTP access control (CORS),
which allows for a relaxation of the restrictions imposed on
the client. By doing so, we would face another problem: in
order to be able to dynamically adjust the needed HTTP
headers, parties exchanging data would have to know each
other in advance – rather an unlikely situation in a real world
scenario.
One notices, that this is shifting control towards the server,
leading to another option where the server acts as a proxy
for the data to be exchanged. Being a seemingly straight-
forward approach, this method has some serious drawbacks
as well. We would have strong concerns regarding security
if the server could be instructed by the client to act as an
open proxy interacting with unknown destinations. Also, for
the purpose of our PoC, hiding the exchanges between ac-
tors is not optimal for the demonstration of the implemented
functionality.
So we finally set with the third option and implemented a
very explicit data exchange using ZIP-files which are down-
loaded by an actor from the remote party and manually
imported into their own CAS. While this may look odd or
even ancient at a first glance, it has some great benefits for
our validation work, which amongst others are: (a) explicit
WebID authentication and authorization are possible – our
main objective in this case; (b) separation of the actors and
adminstrative borders are clearly visible; and (c) interaction
with files is well known to the user.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Our prototype showing the process of study enrollment
demonstrated, that by using Linked Data technologies, con-
crete and practical administrative workflows can be imple-
mented easily and without hassles. Authentication and au-
thorization using WebID stands the test regarding security
requirements in that area – an integration into other, trusted
identification systems such as SuisseID is technically possi-
ble and would enhance the WebID in terms of trust.
The prototype gave us insights in cross-domain triple store
interaction and provided a model for future implementations
of processes and workflows based on Linked Data technolo-
gies. During the implementation, we encountered some is-
sues, most notably related to the same origin policy of mod-
ern browsers. For these issues, we gave an overview of pos-
sible solutions and described the one chosen.
Besides technical problems, our research clearly showed
weak points in WebID. Regarding broader acceptance of the
technology, as means for authentication and especially as a
“token” for permission handling, future work for better in-
tegration, portability and especially userfriendlyness must
be undertaken. Here, we are particularly interested in ap-
proaches taken by recent projects like Solid – and whether
those will be successful in solving these issues.
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